Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination

Printer-friendly versionPDF version

Publication Type:

Journal Article

Source:

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Volume 55, p.81-90 (2015)

URL:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804315000099

Keywords:

altruistic preferences, considerate attitudes, dictator game, gender discrimination, non-deceptive obfuscation

Abstract:

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behavior and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behavior.

AttachmentSize
PDF icon dynamic_random_dictator.2015.pdf222.01 KB